PROXY VOTING PROCEDURES AND PRINCIPLES

The following summarizes the internal operating procedures and principles adopted by Capital Bank and Trust CompanySM, Capital InternationalSM, Inc., Capital Research and Management CompanySM and their investment advisory affiliates, Capital Group Private Client ServicesSM, Inc., Capital International Asset Management (Canada)SM, Inc., Capital International K.K.SM, Capital International LimitedSM, Capital International Management Company SàrlSM and Capital International SàrlSM and Capital Group Investment Management Pte. Ltd. (the “Advisers”) for voting (1) proxies of portfolio companies held by mutual funds and exchange traded funds which are registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and managed by the Advisers, (2) proxies of portfolio companies held by funds organized under collective investment trusts and other pooled investment vehicles managed by the Advisers, and (3) proxies of securities held in client accounts for which the Advisers have proxy voting authority. These proxy voting procedures and principles are reasonably designed to ensure that proxies are voted in the best interest of the Advisers’ clients and the shareholders of the funds advised or managed by the Advisers.

SUMMARY

The Advisers are committed to acting in the best interests of their clients. We view proxies of companies held in client portfolios as significant assets and proxy voting as an integral part of our engagement and the investment process. The voting process reflects our understanding of a company’s business, its management and its relationship with shareholders over time. In addition to our annual review of specific proposals (including discussions with corporate management representatives), we meet with companies throughout the year to discuss various governance and proxy voting topics. In all cases, the investment objectives and policies of the funds and accounts we manage remain the focus.

These proxy voting procedures and principles (“Principles”) provide an important framework for analysis and decision-making with respect to issues that arise in proxy voting. While we generally adhere to these Principles, we have the flexibility to vote each proposal based on the specific circumstances that we believe are relevant. As a result, each proxy is analyzed and voted on a case-by-case basis.

As a matter of policy, we take an objective approach in assessing and voting on matters, seeking to avoid being influenced by outside sources or business relationships involving interests that may conflict with those of clients. In addition, we do not, as a policy, follow the voting recommendations provided by Institutional Shareholder...
Services (ISS), Glass-Lewis & Co. or other third-party advisory firms ("Advisory Firms"), which provide research that the Advisers may utilize on a case-by-case basis in addition to our proprietary proxy voting, governance and executive compensation research. We periodically assess the information provided by the Advisory Firms, including information regarding potential conflicts of interest, and report to the applicable governance committees that provide oversight of the application of these Principles.

PROXY VOTING PROCESS

The Advisers seek to vote all U.S. proxies. Proxies for companies outside the U.S. are also voted where there is sufficient time and information available, taking into account distinct market practices, regulations and laws, and types of proposals presented in each country. Where there is insufficient proxy and meeting agenda information available, the Advisers will generally vote against such proposals in the interest of encouraging improved disclosure for investors.

The Advisers may not exercise their voting authority if voting would impose costs on clients, including opportunity costs. For example, certain regulators have granted investment limit relief to the Advisers and their affiliates, conditioned upon limiting its voting power to specific voting ceilings. To comply with these voting ceilings, the Advisers will scale back their votes across all funds and accounts they manage on a pro rata basis based on assets. In addition, certain countries impose restrictions on the ability of shareholders to sell shares during the proxy solicitation period. The Advisers may choose, due to liquidity issues, not to expose the funds and accounts they manage to such restrictions and may not vote some (or all) shares. Finally, the Advisers may determine not to recall securities on loan to exercise their voting rights when they determine that the cost of doing so would exceed the benefits to clients or that the vote would not have a material impact on the investment. Proxies with respect to securities on loan through client-directed lending programs are not available to vote and therefore are not voted.

After a proxy is received, the Advisers’ stewardship and engagement team prepares a summary of the proposals contained in the proxy statement. A notation of any potential conflicts of interest also is included in the summary (see below under “Special review procedures”).

Investment analysts are generally responsible for making voting recommendations for their investment division on significant votes that relate to companies in their coverage areas. Analysts also have the opportunity to review initial recommendations made by the Advisers’ stewardship and engagement team for routine matters. Depending on the vote, a second recommendation may be made by a proxy coordinator (an investment professional with experience in corporate governance and proxy voting matters) within the appropriate investment division, based on knowledge of these Principles and familiarity with proxy-related issues. In this way, we seek to bring multiple perspectives to the voting process.

Each of the Advisers’ equity investment divisions has its own proxy voting committee, which is made up of investment professionals within each division. The proxy summary and voting recommendations are made available to the appropriate proxy voting
committee for a final voting decision. Therefore, if more than one fund or account invests in the same company, certain funds and accounts may vote differently on the same proposal. In addition, while voting recommendations are generally applicable to all funds and accounts managed by the investment division, the Advisers may vote differently depending on the investment objective and strategy of a particular fund or account.

**Special review procedures**

From time to time the Advisers may vote proxies issued by, or on proposals sponsored or publicly supported by (1) a client with substantial assets managed by the Advisers or their affiliates, (2) an entity with a significant business relationship with The Capital Group Companies, Inc. or its affiliates, or (3) a company with a U.S. mutual fund director on its board (each referred to as an “Interested Party”). Other persons or entities may also be deemed an Interested Party if facts or circumstances appear to give rise to a potential conflict. The Advisers analyze these proxies and proposals on their merits and do not consider these relationships when casting their vote.

The Advisers have developed procedures to identify and address instances where such a relationship may affect the exercise of the Advisers’ best judgment as a fiduciary. Under the procedures, if a potential conflict is identified, the Special Review Committee (“SRC”) of the investment division that is voting the proxy will be provided a summary of any relevant communications with the Interested Party, the rationale for the voting decision, information on the organization’s relationship with the Interested Party and any other pertinent information. If the SRC determines, based on the information provided, that a conflict of interest could affect the Advisers’ best judgment as a fiduciary, the SRC will take appropriate steps to address the conflict of interest, including, if appropriate, engaging an independent, third-party fiduciary to vote the proxy. The SRC includes senior investment professionals and legal and compliance professionals.

**Allocating votes for comanaged funds**

In cases where a fund or an account is comanaged and a security is held by more than one of the Advisers’ equity investment divisions, the divisions may develop different voting recommendations for individual ballot proposals. If this occurs, and if permitted by local market conventions, the position will generally be voted proportionally by divisional holding, according to their respective decisions. Otherwise, the outcome will be determined by the equity investment division or divisions with the larger position in the security as of the record date for the shareholder meeting.

**Proxy voting for fund of funds and other pooled vehicles**

In cases where the underlying fund of an investing fund managed by the Advisers, including a fund of funds, holds a proxy vote, such vote is reviewed by the Special Review Committee based on the procedures described above.

**Considerations for accounts held with Capital Group Private Clients Services, Inc. (CGPCS)**
CGPCS accepts proxy voting authority from its clients and follows these proxy voting procedures and principles. If CGPCS has voting authority for a client account, it generally does not provide the client the option to direct a proxy vote with respect to a particular solicitation.

Some clients reserve the right to vote proxies and do not give CGPCS the authority to vote on their behalf. In those cases, clients should contact their custodian about receiving proxies. CGPCS would not expect to discuss particular solicitations with clients for whom it does not have proxy voting authority.

**Proxy voting for companies outside the United States**

As noted above, we vote proxies for companies outside the U.S. whenever practicable. If insufficient proxy and meeting agenda information is provided, we will seek to obtain information to allow for an informed voting decision; however, when our efforts do not yield sufficient information, we will generally vote against those proposals in the interest of encouraging improved disclosure for investors.

Certain countries impose restrictions on the ability of shareholders to sell shares during the proxy solicitation period. We may choose, due to liquidity issues, not to expose the funds and accounts to such restrictions and thus may not vote some (or all) shares that we own.

The Principles are applied on a country-by-country basis, taking into account distinct market practices, regulations and laws, and types of proposals presented in each country. Also, an analyst from the Adviser’s appropriate investment division is consulted whenever an issue is not standard.

**PRINCIPLES**

The following principles are grouped according to types of proposals usually presented to shareholders in proxy statements.

**Auditors**

We believe that objective, independent audits are critical for providing investors with clear disclosures regarding the fundamental health of a business. We examine several factors that may affect the quality of an audit and an auditor’s objectivity. We use engagement as a tool to reduce risk related to audit in our portfolio companies. In certain circumstances, this may escalate to a negative vote on auditor ratification and related items.

**Director matters**

*Election of directors*

As active fund managers, we value ongoing engagement with our investee companies in advancing the long-term interests of our clients, and proxy voting is an important part of that process. Director elections are of particular importance, as we believe a company’s board of directors plays a key role in the success of the company. In
discharging their fiduciary duties, we expect boards to, among other things, be responsive to and act in the best interests of shareholders and to exercise appropriate oversight over the management and business of the company.

We generally support the annual election of a company’s nominees for director. We may, however, oppose all or some of the company’s nominees if we believe it to be in the best interest of shareholders or if, in our view, they have not otherwise fulfilled their fiduciary duties. In making this determination, we consider, among other things, a nominee’s potential conflicts of interest, track record (whether in the current board seat or in previous executive or director roles) with respect to shareholder protection and value creation as well as their capacity for full engagement on board matters.

With respect to capacity, we expect directors to have sufficient time to reflect and make high-quality contributions to the work of the board. As such, we will flag certain situations for additional analysis:

- A sitting CEO, or other senior executive officer, serving on their company board plus more than one additional outside company board (in a non-executive position), and

- A non-executive director serving on more than four public company boards, with each non-executive board chair position considered as two board seats.

When evaluating board nominees, the Advisers will consider company and individual-specific situations and circumstances. These include and are not limited to company size and complexity, business transformation, board and executive turnover, expertise, employment and controversy. We also acknowledge that service on certain boards, such as a mutual fund board or similar, may not give rise to the same concerns. In addition, we will endeavor to engage in advance of the first instance in which we may consider an adverse vote and to address questions, as appropriate.

Importantly, we may consider opposing all or some of the nominees or certain committee members if the independence of a board and/or committee does not comply with local regulations, governance codes, listing standards or reasonable shareholder expectation. Because we expect boards to be collectively accountable for company performance and long-term value creation, we may, albeit rarely, vote against the entire board where we believe they have demonstrably failed in the execution of their duties. Where we feel a specific area has fallen short of our expectations, for example in relation to audit, remuneration or board composition, we may vote against the chair and/or members of the relevant committee.

We evaluate director nominees not only on an individual basis but also in the context of the whole board. We believe boards, as a whole, should have appropriate industry knowledge, skills, business experience and understanding of all relevant stakeholders of the company in order to discharge their duties effectively. This goal is more likely to be met by a board composed of individual directors who can each bring a breadth of experience to their service. We also believe diversity of expertise, gender and, subject to local norms and expectations, race and ethnicity among board members enhances the overall quality of their decision-making.
Independent board chair/Separation of chair and CEO

We believe board independence is essential to good corporate governance. In addition to having a board’s majority made up of independent members, we generally prefer an independent board chair (i.e., not a current or former executive or other affiliated director) as best practice for structural oversight of the executive team. We recognize that, in some cases, a sufficient level of board independence and leadership can be accomplished via other means. For example, in situations where a board has appointed an independent lead director, we will examine that individual’s duties and interaction with the chair/CEO to determine whether a full separation of the roles is still warranted. We analyze board structure, leadership and overall governance on a case-by-case basis in arriving at decisions on whether to support separation of the chair and CEO roles.

Governance provisions

While we would typically support each of the following proposals as best practices if presented separately, we are aware that often a company may already have adopted several of these governance features. In such situations (such as a proposal to add cumulative voting in cases where directors are elected annually and there is a majority vote provision), we would consider whether the additional protections are necessary, or whether a combination of these features would leave a company vulnerable to coercive actions by shareholders with short-term investment horizons.

Shareholder access to the proxy

Proxy access proposals generally require a company to amend its bylaws to allow a qualifying shareholder or group of shareholders to nominate up to two directors on a company’s proxy ballot. To qualify, an individual or group must have owned a certain percentage (typically 3% to 5%) of the company’s shares for a minimum period of time (typically one to three years).

All proposals are reviewed on a case-by-case basis. We generally believe the following:

- The holding period is the most important component of these proposals, since length of ownership demonstrates a commitment that is more likely to be aligned with our interests as long-term shareholders. As such, three years appears reasonable.

- The ownership threshold should be set at the right level to avoid misuse of this provision by those without a significant economic interest in a company, so we generally will apply a sliding scale of 5% for small capitalization companies and 3% for large capitalization companies.

- The number of board seats to be added under these proposals should be capped at a reasonable number (generally 10% to 25%).

- The number and makeup of parties that may nominate directors should be
representative of the broader shareholder base.

We may vote against shareholder proposals to amend existing proxy access bylaws if the company has already adopted a bylaw that meets the general parameters described above.

**Classified boards**

A classified board is one that elects only a percentage of its members each year. (Usually, one-third of directors are elected to serve a three-year term.) Generally, we support proposals declassifying boards. We believe that declassification (i.e., the annual election of all directors) increases a board’s sense of accountability to shareholders.

**Cumulative voting**

Under cumulative voting, each shareholder has a number of votes equal to the number of shares owned multiplied by the number of directors up for election. Shareholders can cast all of their votes for a single nominee, thus allowing minority shareholders to elect a director. We generally support the concept of cumulative voting in order to promote management and board accountability, and the opportunity for leadership change.

**Majority vote requirement**

Generally, we support proposals designed to make director elections more meaningful, either by requiring a majority vote in director elections (more “for” votes than “against”) or by requiring any director receiving more withhold votes to tender their resignation.

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**Anti-takeover provisions, shareholder rights and reincorporation**

**Shareholder rights plans (”poison pills”)**

“Poison pills” are a defense against unwelcome takeover offers. These plans allow shareholders (other than the shareholder making the unwelcome takeover offer) to purchase stock at significantly discounted prices under certain circumstances.

The plans force would-be acquirers to negotiate with the board, effectively giving the board veto power over any offer. Poison pills can be detrimental to the creation of shareholder value and can help entrench management by thwarting or deterring acquisition offers that are not favored by the board but that may be beneficial to shareholders.

We generally support the elimination of existing poison pills and proposals that would require shareholder approval to adopt prospective poison pills. There may be a few select circumstances, however, where the analyst feels a need for the company to maintain anti-takeover protection. Additionally, if a company has crafted a shareholder-friendly pill, we may not support a shareholder proposal to eliminate or amend the existing provisions. One example of this is the Canadian model, which requires shareholder review and consideration of any acquisition offer.

**Other anti-takeover measures**
Anti-takeover provisions that are not classic poison-pills are considered on a case-by-case basis. However, the guiding principle should be that anti-takeover provisions have the ability to suppress potential shareholder value by discouraging acquirers.

**Change of corporate domicile**

- *Reincorporation within the U.S.*: We generally leave the state domicile decision to the discretion of company management and its board.

- *Reincorporation outside the U.S.*: We consider a company's specific circumstances with respect to the reasons for the reincorporation. Factors that may influence whether we support a proposal to reincorporate include the potential for both corporate and shareholder-level taxes to be triggered at the time of the event, as well as the potential long-term impact of country-specific tax treaties.

**Action by written consent/Right to call a special meeting**

We consider several factors relating to these proposals and apply them on a case-by-case basis. These include a company's market capitalization, composition of the company's largest shareholders, its responsiveness to previous shareholder proposals and other forms of feedback, any meeting provisions and ownership thresholds currently in place, and its overall governance structure. While we believe that both the rights to take action by written consent and to call a special meeting are important tools for shareholders, we will consider a company's overall governance profile before supporting shareholder proposals to adopt or amend those rights.

The right to act by written consent (without calling a formal meeting of shareholders) can be a powerful tool for shareholders, especially in a proxy fight. We generally support adoption of this right in principle and oppose proposals that would prevent shareholders from taking action without a formal meeting or that would take away a shareholder’s right to call a special meeting.

The ability to call a special meeting is also a valuable right for shareholders that we generally support. However, we consider the details of these shareholder proposals, particularly the proposed ownership thresholds, and attempt to assess whether a low limit (e.g., 10%) would allow actions by a relatively small group that might not be in the best interests of the majority of shareholders.

**Capitalization**

**Authorization of new common shares**

We generally support reasonable increases in authorized shares when the company has articulated a need (for example, a stock split or recapitalization). Even so, we are aware that new shares may dilute the ownership interest of shareholders. Consequently, other than in the case of stock splits, we generally oppose proposals that would more than double the number of authorized shares.
Authorization of “blank check” preferred shares

“Blank check” preferred shares give the board complete discretion to set terms (including voting rights). Such shares may have voting rights far in excess of those held by common stockholders. We generally oppose proposals that allow a board to issue preferred shares without prior shareholder approval, as well as proposals that allow the board to set the terms and voting rights of preferred shares at their discretion. However, a request for preferred shares with voting rights that are equal to those of existing common stock shares generally would be considered similarly to a request for authorization of new common shares.

Compensation and benefit plans

Advisory vote on executive compensation (say-on-pay)

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) requires companies to allow shareholders to cast advisory (nonbinding) votes on the compensation for named executive officers, as well as the frequency of such votes (every one, two or three years). Under Dodd-Frank, the advisory vote on compensation will cover the Compensation, Discussion and Analysis disclosure, executive compensation tables, and related narrative in company proxy filings.

We generally will ratify executive compensation unless we have specific concerns about the structure or amounts paid at a particular company (based, in part, on the factors outlined below under “Equity incentive plans”). For example, we expect short-term incentives to constitute no more than a third – and long-term incentives to constitute at least two-thirds – of an executive’s overall compensation. We apply additional scrutiny to those companies where we have a history of voting against one or more compensation plans or where we have withheld votes from compensation committee members over the past several years. From time to time, we will vote against say-on-pay proposals if we are dissatisfied with a component of the overall compensation policy (e.g., high dilution, ability to reprice or exchange options, cash bonus caps expressed as a percentage of net income rather than hard dollar stop).

With respect to the frequency of advisory votes on compensation, we historically found the triennial option to be most consistent with our long-term focus at companies that presented no obvious compensation-related concerns. We acknowledge that it is often difficult for companies to make significant changes within a 12-month period and found that we have ongoing engagement with companies even when the say-on-pay votes occur less frequently. Annual votes, however, allow for regular feedback and ongoing monitoring of the impact of any policy changes. Accordingly, we will generally support management recommendation for annual votes. When longer frequencies are proposed (e.g., biennial or triennial), we will consider these proposals on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the company’s current practices and any history of concerns related to compensation.

Equity incentive plans
Incentive plans are complicated, and many factors are considered when evaluating a plan. No single factor is determinative; investment professionals weigh each plan based on protecting shareholder interests and our historical knowledge of the company and its management. Factors include:

- **Pricing**: We believe options should be priced to at least 100% of fair market value (the price that shareholders would pay on the open market) on the date they are granted. We do not generally support options priced at a discount to the market.

- **Repricing**: An “out-of-the-money” option has an exercise price that is higher than the current price of the stock. We generally have not supported replacing “out-of-the-money” options with new options at a lower exercise price (generally known as “repricing”) because it is not consistent with a policy of offering options as a form of long-term compensation. However, there may be circumstances under which we would consider a limited exchange program (including value-neutral exchanges).

- **Dilution**: Dilution is the reduction of the voting power and/or economic interest of existing shareholders due to an increase in shares available for distribution to company employees in lieu of cash compensation. We consider several kinds of dilution: the historical annual dilution of the current plan, the potential dilution of the proposed plan and the cumulative dilution of all option plans. We tend to oppose plans that result in “excessive” dilution for existing shareholders. Acceptable dilution levels are not rigidly defined but will be a function of the (i) stage of the company’s lifecycle (embryonic to mature), (ii) company size (market capitalization), (iii) historical growth rate of sales and earnings, (iv) competitive environment and (v) extenuating circumstances related to the company’s industry. In addition, greater dilution can be tolerated when options are awarded to all employees rather than to top-level management only. We generally oppose evergreen plans (which provide for an automatic annual increase of shares available for awards without shareholder approval).

- **Performance**: We prefer linking compensation (cash and equity) to appropriate performance criteria that encourage a long-term focus, consistent with our approach to investing.

- **Shares available for awards**: Requests for additional incentive plan shares, where there are a substantial number of shares currently in reserve, will receive additional scrutiny to ensure that a company continues to award equity at an appropriate rate.

- **Option expensing**: We generally support option expensing in theory and will generally support shareholder proposals on option expensing if such proposal language is nonbinding and does not require the company to adopt a specific expensing methodology.

**Restricted stock plans**

We support restricted stock plans when such grants replace cash compensation without increasing the historical cash award and when the amount of restricted stock available
for distribution represents a reasonable percentage of overall equity awards. We also consider performance criteria and other vesting requirements, as well as the economic value of the restricted stock when compared to options.

**Non-employee director compensation**

We generally support equity-based compensation for non-employee directors that aligns their interests with shareholders. Such plans must be reasonable in size, have fair-market-value option grants and not create excess total compensation. (They should be subject to the same limitations as executive incentive plans.) We also review the mix of options, stock awards and cash compensation. We believe that compensation packages should be structured to attract, motivate and retain qualified directors, but that excessive board compensation can undermine the board’s independence.

**Employee stock purchase plans**

We generally support employee stock purchase plans, which are designed to allow employees to purchase stock at a discount price and to receive favorable tax treatment when the stock is sold. In many cases, the price is 85% of the market value of the stock. These plans are broad-based and have relatively low caps on the amount of stock that may be purchased by a single employee. We generally do not take opposition to the use of evergreen provisions if they are strictly applied to employee stock purchase plans.

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**Shareholder proposals regarding executive compensation**

**Caps on executive pay**

In general, we oppose shareholder proposals that seek to set limits on executive compensation, because competitive compensation packages are necessary to attract, motivate and retain executives. Shareholder proposals on this issue tend to specify arbitrary compensation criteria.

**Executive pay restrictions or freezes**

We generally oppose proposals specifying restrictions on executive pay, because they take away compensation committee flexibility. Such proposals include terminating the company’s option or restricted stock programs, freezing executive pay during periods of large layoffs, establishing a maximum ratio between the highest paid executive and lowest paid employee, and linking executive pay to social criteria.

**Executive severance agreements**

Generally, we support proposals that require shareholder approval of executive severance agreements, largely because of the trend toward excessive severance benefits (also known as golden parachutes). If an executive leaves for reasons related to poor performance, allowing a generous “parting gift” seems contrary to good corporate governance. While we typically support proposals asking that such severance be limited to 2.99 times pay and bonus (amounts over this threshold are subject to a 20% excise tax), we may vote against proposals that request a lower limitation.
Other shareholder proposals

General principles

When evaluating shareholder proposals, we consider their materiality to the company and their ability to generate long-term value in light of the company's business model and specific operating context. We generally favor transparency, as it allows our investment professionals to better understand a company's risks and opportunities and its long-term value drivers. Comparing a company against its peers and against prevailing “best practices” in the relevant sector each provides helpful benchmarking that also informs our voting decisions. In addition, we support increased standardization of disclosures, particularly ones that leverage existing regulatory reporting or industry best practices, to allow for greater comparability among companies.

We will generally avoid supporting proposals that are overly prescriptive, taking into account, among other things, the current policies, practices and regulatory obligations of the company. We consider whether a shareholder proposal is nonbinding and may vote in favor of a proposal that addresses either a material shortcoming or an area in which the company has not shown sufficient progress, even if the proposal would benefit from some modification before being implemented.

Where applicable, we will also seek to apply other principles articulated in this document.

Political spending and advocacy

We review shareholder proposals relating to political expenditures on a case-by-case basis. In order to make a voting decision, we consider:

1) whether there currently is a policy in place regarding political spending;

2) the level of political spending oversight by the board and management team; and

3) a company’s current disclosure practices and whether the company has been subject to any previous fines or litigation.

We will generally support company disclosure regarding political spending and advocacy, including industry body membership. This is particularly the case when the current disclosure on political contributions is insufficient or significantly lacking compared to a company’s peers, there are verifiable or credible allegations of funds mismanagement through donations, or either there is no explicit board oversight or there is evidence that board oversight on political expenses is inadequate. On the other hand, we may not support a shareholder proposal if the information requested is already available in another report or the company meets the criteria noted above. We do encourage companies to disclose information relating to their political spending and advocacy against the criteria put forth by the Center for Political Accountability.
Social issues

We know that social issues, such as employee safety, community engagement and human rights (including with respect to a company’s supply chain), are important factors that can affect companies’ long-term prospects for success. As such, they are researched by our investment professionals as part of the investment process and are also considered within the framework described above, under “General principles,” when reviewing shareholder proposals. This approach is consistent with the stated investment objectives and policies of the funds and accounts we manage.

Generally, we believe racial and gender equity and diversity within a company’s workforce, including its management and the board of directors, contribute to the company’s long-term value creation. To that end, subject to local norms and expectations, we expect companies to be able to articulate a strategy or plan to advance these values. Additionally, we support reporting and disclosure of data relating to workforce diversity and equity across various types of roles and levels of seniority, consistent with broadly applicable standards (e.g., Employment Information Report (EEO-1) and U.K. pay gap reporting) and will generally support shareholder proposals requesting EEO-1 disclosure.

Environmental issues

As with other types of proposals, when reviewing those related to environmental issues (including climate change policy and reporting), we take into account the investment implications and are required to vote in a manner consistent with the objectives of the funds and accounts we manage. We examine each environmental issue within the context of each specific company’s situation, including any potentially negative impact to the company’s business or operations that we feel have not been properly addressed. In formulating a voting decision on these issues, we weigh the set of factors described under “General principles” above: the issue’s materiality to the company, overall value of transparency and standardization of disclosure, the prescriptive and/or nonbinding nature of the shareholder proposal, best-in-class practices by peer group companies and best practices in the applicable sector.

We generally believe environmental issues present investment risks and opportunities that can shape a company’s long-term financial sustainability. Accordingly, we expect companies to disclose against the standards set forth by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) and the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). We also expect companies to publish sustainability reporting. We will generally vote against proposals that call for director candidates with specialized expertise because, in addition to the importance of an individual director’s breadth of experience (as discussed above under “Election of directors”), we believe overly prescriptive proposals can create burdensome limitations on the effectiveness of a company’s oversight. However, where the company is in a sector with particular exposure to climate-related risks and we believe directors with specialized expertise would enhance the company’s ability to mitigate such risks and create long-term value, we will consider voting in favor of such proposals.
Supplemental Regional Guidance

For voting in relation to markets in the Americas region, Europe, Middle East and African region (EMEA) and the Asia-Pacific region (APAC), we have developed additional voting guidance to address regional differences in either local market regulation or standards of corporate governance best practice. In the event of a material difference between the regional guidance and our Proxy Voting Procedures and Principles, the latter shall prevail.